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Jonah Brown 
 
When landowners seek to determine if a permit is required from 
the Army Corps of Engineers to discharge dredged or fill material into 
waters within their property boundaries, they may first obtain a 
jurisdictional determination specifying whether “waters of the United 
States” are present. In an 8-0 judgment, Army Corps of Engineers v. 
Hawkes was a victory for landowners, concluding that an approved 
jurisdictional determination is a final agency action reviewable under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Determining whether “waters of the United States” (“WOTUS”) 
are present on private property can be a challenging process.1 Because of 
this difficulty, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) allows a property 
owner to obtain a preliminary or approved “jurisdictional determination” 
(“JD”) that specifies whether their property contains such waters.2 United 
States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes concerned an approved JD 
concluding that land owned by peat mining companies (“Respondents”) 
contained WOTUS because of its nexus to the Red River.3 Respondents 
argued that an approved JD was reviewable under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”). The Corps argued that an approved JD is not 
reviewable because it is not a final agency action. Further, the Corps 
argued that Respondents have the option to proceed without a permit and 
assert that one is not required, or complete the permit process and then 
seek judicial review.4  The United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota dismissed the action in favor of the Corps, holding that a JD is 
not a final agency action.5 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that an 
approved JD is reviewable and parties do not need to await enforcement 
proceedings before they challenge the final agency action.6 By applying 
the two part test used in Bennett v. Spear to determine the finality of an 
agency action, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth 
Circuit that an approved JD is conclusory and affirmed the Eighth Circuit 
ruling.7 
 
 
                                                     
1  United States Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 U.S. 
1807, 1812 (2016). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. at 1813.  
4  Id.  
5  Id.  
6  Id.  
7  Id. at 1816 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997)). 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Obtaining a permit to discharge fill material into wetlands can be 
a challenging and expensive process that may take years.8 A landowner 
seeking to discharge such material into waters within their land may 
obtain a JD to ensure compliance with the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) 
section 404 permitting requirement.9 There are substantial criminal and 
civil penalties associated with discharge into such waters without a 
permit, but obtaining a permit is extremely costly.10 One study shows 
that the average applicant spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing 
the process.11 Further, “general” permits may take applicants over 300 
days to complete.12 
Though it is not an express requirement, the Corps may issue a 
JD stating whether or not the property contains WOTUS when a 
landowner wishes to discharge fill material into such waters.13 The Corps 
defines WOTUS to include “mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, 
prairie potholes, wet meadows, [and] playa lakes[.]”14 The application of 
this definition to wetlands throughout the United States has allowed the 
Corps to regulate over 270-to-300 million acres of lands in the United 
States – including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the 
lower 48 States.15  
JDs may come in two different varieties: preliminary or 
approved. A preliminary JD is issued when the Corps has determined 
that there may be waters of the United States within the property. An 
approved JD, on the other hand, states with finality whether or not such 
waters are present.16 If an approved JD is issued specifying that there are 
no WOTUS, a landowner may discharge without a permit and will not 
risk CWA violations. However, if the JD identifies the land as containing 
WOTUS, then the landowner must pursue a permit in order to avoid 
penalties.17 
The land at issue in this case involved a 530-acre tract that 
included wetlands owned by Respondents in Minnesota.18 Respondents 
operated peat mining companies near the tract in question and desired to 
expand their operation, believing that the tract contained high-quality 
peat.19 Peat is an organic material that can be burned as fuel or provide 
                                                     
8  Hawkes, 136 S.Ct. at 1813. 
9  Id. (citing 33. U.S.C. § 1344(a)) “A section 404 permit authorizes 
the ‘discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites.’” 
10  Id. at 1809 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c), (d), 1344(a)).  
11  Id. at 1812 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721).   
12  Id. See 33 CFR § 323.2(h) defining “general” permits.  
13  Id. at 1811 (citing 33. C.F.R. § 331.2).  
14  Id. at 1811 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2012)).  
15  Id. at 1811-1812 (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 722).  
16  Id. at 1812. 
17  Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (a)).   
18  Id. at 1812.  
19  Id.  
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structural support for golf course greens.20 Peat is found in waterlogged 
grounds such as wetlands and, in spite of its wide usage, peat mining can 
have significant environmental impacts.21 
Respondents applied for a permit from the Corps in December 
2010, seeking authorization to discharge material into the waters within 
their property.22 As a preliminary measure to the permitting process, the 
Corps issued an approved JD that specified the wetlands in question were 
WOTUS because they had a “significant nexus” to the Red River, some 
120 miles away.23 Respondents first appealed this JD, which was 
remanded. On remand, the Corps reaffirmed its decision and issued a 
revised JD furthering its conclusion.24 
Respondents sought judicial review of the JD under the APA.25 
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that 
the JD was not a “final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in court,” and thus dismissed the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.26 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision, concluding that an approved JD is a final agency 
action, and was therefore reviewable under the APA.27 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
The Supreme Court examined the issue of whether a JD is a final 
agency action that may be reviewed under the APA.28 The court looked 
to the test in Bennett to determine whether the agency action was final.29 
Bennett established a two-part test that generally must be satisfied to 
constitute a final action under the APA: “First, the action must mark the 
consummation of the agency’s decision making process … And second, 
the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been 
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”30  
When the Court applied the Bennett test, it found that a 
preliminary JD would not be a consummation of an agency’s decision 
making process because it is merely an indeterminate conclusion.31 In 
contrast, the court found that an approved JD was the consummation of 
the Corps’ evaluation because it “definitively” determines that certain 
                                                     
20  Id.  
21  Id.  
22  Id. at 1813.  
23  Id.  
24  Id.  
25  Id. See 5 U.S.C. § 500.  
26  Id. (quoting Hawkes Co. v. U.S Army Corps of Eng’rs, 963 
F.Supp.2d 868, 872, 878 (Minn.2013).  
27  Id. (citing Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 
994, 1002 (8th Cir. 2015)).  
28  Id. at 1811. 
29  Id. at 1813. 
30  Id. (quoting Bennett 520 U.S. at 177-178).   
31  Id.  
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property contains jurisdictional waters.32 Further, the Corps did not 
dispute that the first prong of the Bennett test was satisfied when an 
approved JD was issued.33 
 Turning then to the second prong of the test, the Court found that 
since there was a definitive nature associated with approved JDs, there 
were legal consequences that flowed from them.34 Both positive and 
negative JDs have consequences because of a negative JDs potential to 
limit liability landowners may face, as they will not be subject to 
enforcement proceedings under the CWA for discharge into the 
corresponding wetlands during the established time period.35 Further, the 
Corps and the EPA share a memorandum of agreement that binds the two 
agencies to a five-year safe harbor from CWA enforcement proceedings 
if a negative JD is issued.36 A positive JD has legal consequences as well 
because it is a denial of protection from enforcement proceedings if the 
landowner is to discharge into those waters, and a violation may subject 
the owner to criminal and civil penalties if they fail to obtain a permit.37 
 Regardless of whether or not an agency action is final, there 
must be no adequate alternatives to the APA in order for the action to be 
reviewable.38 Consequently, the Corps asserted that Respondents had two 
viable alternatives: discharging fill material without a permit with the 
assumption that the land does not require a permit, or apply for a permit 
and then seek review if the result is unsatisfactory.39  
 Having determined that an approved JD was final, the Court 
found that neither one of the alternatives presented were an adequate 
remedy. If a party was to discharge without a permit, with the mistaken 
belief that they did not require such a permit, they would face penalties 
of up to $37,000 for every day that the CWA was violated.40 It has also 
been well settled that parties do not need to wait for enforcement 
proceedings before they challenge a final agency action when they are at 
risk of criminal and civil penalties.41 The Court thus concluded that the 
judgment of the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed.42  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
                                                     
32  Id. at 1813-1814. 
33  Id. at 1813. 
34  Id. at 1814. 
35  Id.   
36  Id. (See Memorandum of Agreement §§ IV-C-2, VI-A). Justice 
Ginsburg, concurring in the judgment, disagreed that the memorandum of agreement 
and the safe harbor were not a basis for determining that a JD is final. Id. at 1818-
1819. 
37  Id. at 1814-15. 
38  Id. at 1815 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).  
39  Id.  
40  Id. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)-(d).  
41  Id. (citing Abbot Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967)).  
42  Id.  
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Army Corps of Engineers v. 
Hawkes may be fairly regarded as a victory in favor of private property 
rights and landowners that seek assurance with regard to their CWA 
compliance. Landowners hoping to obtain a determination of whether 
their property contains WOTUS are now provided with, what the Court 
unanimously believes to be, procedural due process under the CWA. 
Those dissatisfied with an approved JD may now immediately litigate in 
federal court rather than having to bear the risk of discharging without a 
permit, or waiting until the arduous permitting process is complete. 
 Further, this decision is a victory in favor of those in opposition 
to the broad reaches of the CWA. In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy opined that “the reach and systemic consequences of 
the Clean Water Act remain a cause for concern.” Justice Kennedy then 
followed by extending Justice Alito’s description of the CWA as 
“notoriously unclear.”43 Justice Kennedy’s opinion, in which Justices 
Thomas and Alito joined, presents doubts with regard to the 
constitutionality of the CWA and its implications on landowners use and 
enjoyment of their land. Thus, it is unclear whether this case will serve as 
a basis for a narrower interpretation of the CWA. Directly, however, the 
decision will likely result in a more predictable and less expensive 
process for landowners, as they are no longer required to complete the 
whole permitting process only to have their permit denied.  
                                                     
43  Id. (quoting Justice Alito in Sackett, 132 U.S. at 1367, 1374-
1375).  
